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Orbiter Water Dump Nozzle Redesign
• During STS-41B and STS-41D Space Shuttle missions, an icicle formed over the 
supply and wastewater dump nozzles. This could have caused hazardous impacts 
on the side and aft end of the Orbiter during entry.
• The two occurrences of this problem had two different causes:
o STS-41B – problem caused by a water pressure drop to the nozzles that 
widened the spray patterns.
o STS-41D – problem caused by the new thermal protection blankets 
installation around the nozzles.
• The concern was that during the entry, the air flow path was aligned from the 
Orbiter side nozzles’ location to the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) pod 
location, and any ice on the nozzles could strike the OMS pod when released.
• My task was to redesign the nozzle configuration to prevent icicle formation. 
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Orbiter Water Dump Nozzle Redesign 
• The STS-41B icicle that formed in a vacuum at about 80% density of solid ice was 
about 200 lbs of fuel cell water and wastewater (humidity water and urine ice 
pellets): 
o The base of the icicle was about 2+ ft diameter over both nozzles, and 
estimated to be about 5+ ft long:
 This was based on the entry burn stain from the urine solids on the 
Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) tile.
 The length was based on vacuum chamber testing. 
• Post-landing inspection found several tiles damaged in line to the OMS pod, and 
several hits on top of the left wing.
• The big concern – the OMS fuel tank’s pod structural cover, which had about 2 sq
ft damage on pod tile with the non-metallic structure, crumbled behind the tile, 
with only the wire mesh holding the tile together. 
• Note that no tile was missing during the decent. 
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First Lesson Learned
• Mission Operations desired to do a dual potable and wastewater dump:
oWe did not do a full analysis of the pressure control system for a dual dump of 
potable water and wastewater systems.
o There were two pressure control regulators and a relief valve, but only one 
system was active as designed for one active dump system.
o The pressure regulator had a max flow rate of 1.2 lb/hr.
oPost event, I did the analysis of the reg flow rate vs. the potable and 
wastewater tanks’ dual dump nozzle water flow rates that verified that the 
single regulator could not maintain the pressure on the water tanks.
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Orbiter Water Dump Nozzle Redesign 
• STS-41D was the first flight with TPS blankets on 
the side of the Orbiter that formed an ideal trap 
for ice collection around the nozzles:
o The nozzle was recessed in a blanket circular 
valley.
o This time, the flight directors listened and the 
Orbiter arm was moved to view the icicle. 
oA procedure was developed to bump the 
icicle off with the arm after testing the 
strength of the ice attachment to the side 
blankets in a vacuum chamber. 
o The icicle removal was successful.
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Orbiter Water Dump Nozzle Redesign
• After testing several nozzle designs, a sharp edge orifice was selected that had a 
near zero spray pattern: 
oAt 20 ft, it had less than 2 ft diameter spray pattern vs. the old nozzle of about 
6+ ft diameter at normal water pressure. 
oAt 50% pressure, the sharp edge nozzle spray pattern had almost no change.
• I directed Rockwell and the nozzle vendor to drill out the current straight-edge 
nozzle to a sharp-edge nozzle and assumed that Rockwell and the vendor would 
do the drawing dimensional tolerance analysis. This led to the following 
problems:
oBecause this was a simple drill out of the flow path with ¼ bit, no one did the 
analysis.
oBecause of this, we drilled out two spare dump nozzles, and installed them for 
the next flight.
• Directed Rockwell to install black tile around the two nozzles with the nozzle 0.1 
inch above the tile on vehicles with the TPS blankets.
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Old Nozzle Design
22.5 W 
heater coils
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Orbiter Water Dump Nozzle Redesign
• One of the four sensor wells had a small water leak path through it and 
unusual temperature drops during the supply water dumps – the first error.
• Rockwell or their vendor suggested putting a braze plug in the bottom of the 
sensor well about 0.1 to 0.2 inch thick.
• I assumed that they had a solder expert to review this, but no one did it.
• The next flight had two new nozzles installed with a braze plug, and we had 
the same problem with a water leak into a sensor well.
• Brazen requires two surfaces with no more than a 0.0005-inch thick layer of 
braze compound.
• Then we brazed a metal plug into the bottom of old nozzle sensor wells and 
changed the drawing to include a new nozzle that did not require the plug.
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Orbiter Water Dump Nozzle Redesign
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Orbiter Water Dump Nozzle Redesign
• Lessons learned:
oNo change is simple; all changes must be integrated with other 
systems that can be impacted.
oMust fully analyze, test, and/or assess any new off-normal 
operations.
oEngineers are not experts in all technical areas. An expert is 
needed to check any technique used in design change. 
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